Commercial Transactions by Payne, Kathleen E.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-1982
Commercial Transactions
Kathleen E. Payne
Michigan State University College of Law, payneka@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathleen E. Payne, Commercial Transactions, 28 Wayne L. Rev. 651 (1981-1982).
HeinOnline -- 28 Wayne L. Rev. 651 1981-1982
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
KATHLEEN E. PAYNEt 
CONTENTS 
I. COVERTURE....................................... 651 
II. EsCROW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 661 
III. NEGOT!ABLE INSTRUMENTS ......................... 669 
IV. BAILMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 672 
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS-Default Under Article Nine .. 676 
VI. ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 679 
INTRODUCTION 
The most significant case decided during the survey period for 
practitioners in the commercial law area abolished coverture as a 
defense for the wife's separate estate where a judgment is obtained 
against a husband and wife on a joint obligation. While the other 
commercial cases do not change the law, several are cases of first im-
pression in Michigan. One bailment case, addressing the question of 
whether lost profits are available under article 7 for a warehouseman's 
improper handling and storage of goods, is the first of its kind in the 
country. 
I. COVERTURE 
The common law defense of coverture,l the subject matter and 
application of which Michigan courts have struggled with during the 
t Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. Member of the 
Michigan Bar; J.D. 1977, Detroit College of Law; LL.M. 1981, University of Michigan. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of R. Owen 
Richards. - ED. 
• 1. "The condition or state of a married woman. Sometimes used elliptically to 
describe the legal disability which formerly existed from a state of coverture." Black's 
Law Dictionary 439 (5th ed. 1979). 
651 
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past decade, 2 is addressed during this survey period in a case which 
may finally resolve the controversy. 3 With wide range counseling 
ramifications for the married small-scale commercial client, a panel of 
the Michigan Court of Appeals in Mz·chz"gan Natz"onal Leasz"ng Corp. v. 
Cardz"llo4 held that article 10, section 1 of the 1963 Michigan Constitu-
tion, in abolishing common law disabilities of coverture as to property, 
abrogated all remnants of coverture. By implication, the case fmds 
unconstitutional the Michigan Married Women's Property Act, 5 or at 
the very least, those provisions of the Act which enable a married 
woman to become liable on joint contracts with her husband to the ex-
tent of their joint estate, excluding liability on her separate estate.6 
2. For review purposes, see previous survey issues including: Snider & 
Rochkind, Commercial Transactions, 1978 Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 25 WAYNE L. 
REv. 275, 279 (1979); Snider, Commercial TransacUons, 1976 Ann. Survey of Mich. 
Law, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 423, 426 (1977); Revelos, Commercial Transactions, 1974 
Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 287, 326 (1975). 
3. The Michigan supreme court has granted an application for leave to ap-
peal in this case. The problem created by conflicting court of appeals decisions, on the 
question of the constitutionality of coverture as a defense to a wife's several liability on 
a joint obligation with her husband, should be resolved with fmality. 412 Mich. 857 
(1981). 
4. 103 Mich. App. 427,302 N.W.2d 888, leave to appeal granted, 412 Mich. 
857 (1981). 
5. Three statutes, enacted in 1855, 1911, and 1917, constitute the Michigan 
Married Women's Property Act. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 557.1-.5, .11, .51-.55 
(1967). The effect of the three statutes is to allow a married woman to contract in rela-
tion to her sole and separate estate, in relation to her earnings for services rendered 
outside the home, and jointly with her husband to the extent of their joint estate. See 
Van Syckle, Some Phases of the Michigan Law Relating to Husband and Wife, 1 DET. 
L. REV. 13, 17 (1931). 
6. For purposes of the instant case, the 1917 Act is most relevant. MICH. 
COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 557.51-.55 (1967). The statute allows creditors to levy upon 
jointly held property by abolishing the common law disability of coverture, which 
prevented married women from becoming liable on joint contracts with their 
husbands where no consideration ran to the wife's separate estate. The statutory 
language, however, limited the wife's liability to property held jointly or by the en-
tireties. United States v. O'Hara, 46 F. Supp. 780, 782 (E.D. Mich. 1942). So long as 
consideration did not run to the separate estate of the wife, the disability of coverture 
continued to prevent the wife's joint obligation from being satisfied out of her separate 
estate. 
There were three general ways in which a contract could relate to a married 
woman's separate estate: first, the separate estate of the wife could directly receive or 
benefit from the contractual consideration, see, e.g., Hamilton v. Parent, 152 Mich. 
587, 116 N.W. 367 (1908); second, the wife could personally receive benefit from ser-
vices, see, e.g., Barber v. Eberle's Estate, 131 Mich. 317, 91 N.W. 123 (1902); and 
third, the wife could contract for services which were rendered to a person for whom 
she had legal responsibility, but only if such services were necessary to the performance 
of that responsibility. See, e.g., Goodman v. Shipley, 105 Mich. 439, 63 N.W. 412 
(1895). 
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Accordingly, the Cardz"llo case establishes as a rule of law that the 
separate estate of a married woman is not exempt from satisfaction of 
a judgment obtained against the husband and wife on a joint obliga-
tion where no separate consideration runs to the wife's estate. 7 
Factually, the Cardz"llo case is straightforward and typical. Cardillo 
Equipment Company, Inc., a corporation engaged in cement contrac-
ting, entered into an agreement with Michigan National Leasing Cor-
poration to lease a cement mixer. At the same time, Frank Cardillo, 
president of Cardillo Equipment, and his wife, Shirley Cardillo, per-
sonally guaranteed performance of the lease by the corporation. 
Based upon a breach of the lease, Michigan National Leasing filed 
a complaint in Oakland Circuit Court seeking damages from the cor-
poration, and from the guarantors, Frank and Shirley Cardillo, jointly 
and severally. At the close of Michigan National's case, defendants' 
counsel asserted that the guaranty was void as to Shirley Cardillo 
based upon the defense of coverture; the trial court sustained the 
defense as to the several, but not the joint, liability of Shirley 
Cardillo.8 On appeal, the court of appeals held that the common law 
disabilities of coverture as to property were abolished and Shirley Car-
dillo's defense, that her separate estate received no consideration, was 
without merit. 9 
In reaching this decision, the court applied a number of rule~ of 
interpretation to the constitutional provision at issue, article 10, sec-
tion 1, which states: 
7. 103 Mich. App. at 435,302 N.W.2d at 892. 
8. Although not stated in the court of appeals opinion, it can be assumed that 
the Cardillos rested their case without the submission of proofs because Michigan Na-
tional had failed to show any separate consideration flowing to Mrs. Cardillo's in-
dividual estate as a result of the guaranty. In the absence of such proof the Married 
Women's Property Act would preclude recovery against Mrs. Cardillo severally: "In 
assumpsit against a married woman plaintiff has the burden of showing that con-
sideration for the obligation sued upon passed to her and that her promise to pay had 
reference to her own separate property." Koengeter v. Ho1zbaugh, 332 Mich. 280, 
283,50 N.W.2d 778,779 (1952), citing Dowagiac Nat'l Bank v. Maier, 285 Mich. 1, 
280 N.W. 86 (1938). For a more recent case, see National Bank v. Meadowbrook 
Heights, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 777, 782, 265 N. W .2d 43, 46 (1977). Without such proof 
the wife's separate estate cannot be applied to the debt. The wife is however jointly 
liable with her husband and execution upon the judgment may issue against the cou-
ple's joint estate and the husband's separate estate. Traverse City State Bank v. Con-
away. 37 Mich. App. 647, 195 N.W.2d 288 (1972). Nor is it necessary for a creditor to 
proceed against the husband's separate estate before proceeding against the joint 
estate. Binne v. Bench, 302 Mich. 327, 4 N.W.2d 674 (1942). 
9. The specific wording of the court's holding is confusing because it lends 
itself to two distinctly different interpretations. 103 Mich. App. at 435, 302 N. W.2d at . 
892. It appears from the language in context that the defense was without merit 
because the appellant's separate estate had received consideration. This interpretation 
is without support in the legal reasoning and analysis of the opinion. 
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The disabilities of coverture as to property are abolished. 
The real and personal estate of every woman acquired before 
marriage and all real and personal property to which she may 
afterwards become entitled shall be and remain the estate and 
property of such woman, and shall not be liable for the debts, 
obligations or engagements of her husband, and may be dealt 
with and disposed of by her as if she were unmarried. Dower 
may be relinquished or conveyed as provided by law. lo 
Applying the "common understanding,"ll "natural significance,"12 
"plain meaning, "13 and "context of the times"14 tests to the key 
language of the provision's first sentence, the court consistently ~rrived 
at the same interpretation: "[W]e conclude that the purpose of the 
amendment was to completely abrogate what final remnants of cover-
ture remained and to relegate the antiquated doctrine to 'history's 
legal museum.' "15 The Cardillo court found further support for this 
conclusion by rejecting a previously drawn distinction between dis-
abilities and defenses of coverture. 16 
The conclusion reached in the Cardillo case is of substantial 
significance because it contradicts an earlier court of appeals panel's 
resolution of the identical question. Ten years after the ratification of 
the Michigan Constitution, a Michigan appellate court in City 
Finance Co. v. Kloostra,17 for the first time squarely addressed the 
potential conflict between the 1963 constitutional provision and the 
Married Women's Property Act. IS In Kloostra, the defendant and her 
10. MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (1964). 
11. Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney Gen., 384 Mich. 390, 405, 185 
N.W.2d 9, 14 (1971), quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 
(1819). 
12. People v. Board of State Canvassers, 323 Mich. 523, 529, 35 N.W.2d 669, 
671 (1949). 
13. Council 23, AFSCME v. Wayne County Civil Servo Comm'n, 32 "Mich. 
App. 243, 247-48, 188 N.W.2d 206, 208 (1971). 
14. People V. Neumayer, 405 Mich. 341, 365, 275 N.W.2d 230, 238 (1979). 
15. 103 Mich. App. at 434-35, 302 N.W.2d at 892. 
16. This distinction was relied upon in an earlier decision by the court of ap-
peals, City Fin. CO. V. Kloostra, 47 Mich. App. 276, 209 N.W.2d 498 (1973), to be 
discussed at length in the text at notes 17 -23 infra. 
17. 47 Mich. App. 276, 209 N.W.2d 498 (1973). The case was reviewed in the 
annual survey issue for the year. See Revelos, supra note 2. 
18. On three prior occasions the appellate courts had the opportunity but 
failed to examine the effect of the 1963 Michigan Constitution on the remaining 
disabilities of coverture. The one case to address the effect of the constitutional provi-
sion did so in off-handed dicta. In Detroit Newspaper Indus. Credit Union V. 
McDonald, 9 Mich. App. 146, 156 N.W.2d 62 (1967), a promissory note was jointly 
executed by husband and wife partially for the purpose of purchasing an automobile. 
The court ruled that the husband signed the note merely as an accommodation party 
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husband jointly executed a note to evidence a loan, the proceeds of 
which were used to purchase an automobile. Shortly thereafter defen-
dant and her husband were divorced, the husband leaving town with 
the car and the loan still unpaid. Upon default the plaintiff, assignee 
of the original payee, sued the defendant on the note. Defendant ad-
mitted the loan but claimed any judgment should be limited to her in-
terest in property previously owned jointly. The trial court granted 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment with unlimited execution on 
the basis that article 10, section 1 of the 1963 Constitution superseded 
the Married Women's Property Act. 19 The court of appeals rejected 
the lower court's constitutional analysis. Following a lengthy discussion 
of the rationale given by the various constitutional convention dele-
gates supporting the constitutional provision, the appellate court con-
cluded that the Married Women's Property Act had not been super-
seded by the constitutional provision because the reasons set forth in 
support of the provision were "inconsistent with an intent to supersede 
the . . . act. "20 According to the court, the delegates intended to ac-
complish three purposes by supporting the proposition: avoid affront-
ing women electors, protect married women and their children from 
hardships, and constitutionalize the Married Women's Property Act. 21 
The court concluded that although the disabilities of coverture or 
lack of capacity to contract were abolished by the constitutional provi-
sion, the delegates intended to preserve the defense of coverture. 22 Ac-
and that the wife received consideration from the note. On this basis, the coun of ap-
peals affirmed the trial coutt ruling that the defense of covenure was not available. 
Alternatively, the coutt stated: 
This appeal did not raise any issues concerning the e££:ect of the Michigan 
Constitution of 1963, effective January 1, 1964. The cause of action in the in-
stant case arose thereafter. The first sentence of Const. 1963, an. 10, § 1, 
states: "The disabilities of covenure as to propeny are abolished." On this 
basis alone we would likewise affirm the trial coutt. 
[d. at 151, 156 N.W.2d at 65, quoting MICH. CONST. an. 10, § 1. In 1970, a concur-
ring' opinion of the Michigan supreme coutt, without reference to the constitutional 
provision, raised two provisions of the Married Women's Propeny Act as possible 
defenses of the female spouse. Yedinak v. Yedinak, 383 Mich. 409, 419,175 N.W.2d 
706, 710 (1970)(Adams, J., concurring), citing MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 557.53-.54 
(1948). Again in 1972, the coutt of appeals dealt with the Married Women's Propeny 
Act without addressing the constitutional provision. Traverse City State Bank v. Con-
away, 37 Mich. App. 647, 649, 195 N.W.2d 288 (1972). 
19. 47 Mich. App. at 277-78, 209 N.W.2d at 499. 
20. [d. at 285,209 N.W.2d at 503. 
21. [d. 
22. The coutt examined the intention of the delegates and concluded: 
The "defense of covenure" which insulates a married woman's separate 
estate from the debts of marriage seems to be just the type of "protection" 
the quoted delegates were attempting to provide. If a husband dies, becomes 
incapacitated, or abandons his family responsibilities, his wife and children 
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cordingly, based upon the authority of Kloostra, a married woman in 
Michigan has been afforded the protection of coverture as a defense to 
a contract where consideration does not relate to her separate estate. 23 
Furthennore, Michigan appellate courts, reluctant to recognize the 
ancient common law defense, may avoid the disdainful result by find-
ing consideration running to the wife'~j.ndividual estate.24 
The result is quite different in nondiversity actions in federal 
court. The common law defense of coverture is not available to ex-
empt the separate estate of the wife from satisfaction of judgment ob-
tained against both spouses in an action by the United States.25 The 
result is based upon federal law26 and administrative regulations.l!7 
Coverture could be a defense in federal court, however, when jurisdic-
tion is founded upon diversity and Michigan law is applied. 28 There-
fore, within the state of Michigan, availability of the coverture defense 
depends upon the nature of the lender and whether state or federal 
law is to be applied. 
Confronted with the divergent views of the Kloostra and Cardz"llo 
op~nions and with knowledge that coverture is unavailable as a defense 
under federal law , the following factors require consideration in deter-
are more secure if the wife's separate estate, at least wages, is completely 
available to meet current expenses. Thus, it is our opinion that those 
delegates who supported the provision in issue herein had no intention of 
making married women jointly and severally liable on joint obligations with 
their husbands. 
[d. at 288,209 N.W.2d at 505. 
23. See, e.g., National Bank v. Meadowbrook Heights, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 
777, 265 N.W.2d 43 (1978)(husband and wife signed as guarantors the promissory 
notes of the defendant corporation and the court upheld the wife's coverture defense). 
See also Att'y Gen. Op. No. 5370 (Sept. 28, 1978). 
24. In Isabella Bank & Trust v. Pappas, 79 Mich. App. 274, 261 N.W.2d 558 
(1977), the court remanded to the trial court for determination of the question of con· 
sideration. The appellate court held that in co·signing a guaranty of payment with her 
husband, the wife presumptively intended to benefit her own estate. 
25. United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Nix-
on, 395 F. Supp. 395 (E.D. Mich. 1975). The United States Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), upholding a Texas coverture defense 
as to the separate estate of the wife in an action by the federal government can be 
distinguished. "[T]he loan to Yazell was individually negotiated in painfully par-
ticularized detail ... with specific reference to Texas law." [d. 345-46. 
26. In cases affecting government money and the credit of the government, 
the authorities set the principle the federal law should apply. 
. . . [I]n fashioning such federal law we rule that the old common law 
defense of coverture to an action on a note executed by a married woman 
under the National Housing Act, is not a valid defense. 
314 F.2d at 303. 
27. 395 F. Supp. at 402-04, citing 13 C.F.R. §§ 101.1(d)(2), (4) (1975). 
28. See Fetter v. United States, 269 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1959). 
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mining the state of Michigan law in the 1980's. First, as to the ques-
tion of what the delegates to the 1961 constitutional convention in-
tended with article 10, section 1, the position taken in Kloostra is 
probably most supportable.29 
The record of the constitutional convention demonstrates 
that the delegates, motivated by a perception that women 
generally, and married women in particular, required special 
legislative protection, were concerned with guaranteeing mar-
ried women limited existing rights with relation to their 
separate estates rather than with granting them additional 
rights. Thus the new married women's property provision was 
intended to do no more than constitutionalize the preexisting 
statutory rights created by the Married Women's Property 
Act. The record also makes clear, however, that it was not the 
convention's intent to constitutionalize the remaining 
common-law disabilities. As Delegate Herman Dehnke stated: 
There isn't anything here whatever to suggest 
that this proposed amendment will be con-
strued in any other way ... [than] as a floor, 
as a limitation below which the legislature can-
not go without any restriction on how much 
farther it may go in promoting the purpose of 
the entire amendment. 
. . . We are merely raising the floor by 
what we are putting in here, and the 
legislature can build from there on.30 
Although after the adoption of the 1963 Constitution mar-
ried women in Michigan remained unable to bind their indi-
29. The Cardillo opinion speaks of today's trend towards equal status. That 
trend was clearly not as widely accepted in 1961 when the delegates cast their votes for 
protection and not equality in eliminating the word sex from the equal protection 
clause. See STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL 
RECORD 3092. 
30. As analyzed by the Kloostra court: 
If it was the intent of the delegates to abolish all distinctions historically 
traceable to coverture, it made no sense to speak of "a floor" below which the 
Legislature could not go and of "promoting the purpose of the entire amend-
ment." If all distinctions are abolished, the Legislature has no discretion. 
Judge Dehnke's remarks made sense only if he distinguished between the 
"disabilities of coverture" and the "defense of coverture." If he made such a 
distinction, the "floor" becomes a prohibition on the reimposition of the 
"disabilities of coverture" and a guarantee of minimum protections. 
47 Mich. App. at 289,209 N.W.2d at 505. 
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vidual property unless the contract related to their separate 
estate, the Michigan legislature retained the power to enact 
laws extending married women's contractual rights. 81 
Furthermore, the Kloostra court was probably correct in its 
analysis that the delegates intended to differentiate between 
disabilities and defenses of coverture, assuming that they viewed 
disability as a lack of capacity and defense as a grant of protection. 
Unfortunately, the distinction drawn by the delegates lacks a logical 
commercial law foundation. By eliminating the disability of coverture 
or the lack of capacity to contract, the married woman's real defense 
under the Uniform Commercial Code,82 good as against a holder in 
due course, is also eliminated. To then say that the defense of cover-
ture survives is incongruous at best. The defense which remains is 
merely failure of consideration running to the separate estate of the 
wife, a personal defense unsuccessful as against a holder in due 
course.88 "[A]s a matter of fundamental policy, it is necessary to 
realize that the disabilities and defenses of coverture are inextricably 
part of the same concept. "84 
Additionally, even if the delegates intended a legally illogical 
result, the defense of coverture rings archaic and indefensible in 198!. 
By raising the defense of coverture, one accepts the common law unity 
of person doctrine, the effect of which is, upon marriage, to merge the 
husband and wife into one person controlled by the husband: 
The wife, by her coverture, ceased to have control of her ac-
tions or her property, which became subject to the control of 
her husband, who alone was entitled, during the marriage, to 
enjoy the possession of her lands, and who became owner of 
her goods and might sue for her demands. The wife could 
31. Note, The Impact of Micht"gan's Common-Law Disabilities of Coverture 
on Married Womens Access to Credit, 74 MICH. L. REv. 76, 96 (1975)(citation omit-
ted). 
32. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.3305(2)(b) (1967). Unless otherwise stated, 
all references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the Code as adopted in Michigan 
at MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 440.1101-.9994 (1967 & Supp. 1981-82). Comment 5 
to this section indicates: "If under the local law the effect is to render the obligation of 
the instrument entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted against a holder in 
due course. If the effect is merely to render the obligation voidable at the election of 
the obligor, the defense is cut off." 
33. This is explained by the difference between a void, real defense, and 
voidable, personal defense, obligation. See z·d. 
34. 103 Mich. App. at 434,302 N.W.2d at 391, quoting Note, The Impact of 
Mz'cht"gan's Common-Law Disabilitz"es of Coverture on Married Womens Access to 
Credz't, 74 MICH. L. REv. 76, 99 (1975). 
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neither possess nor manage property in her own right, could 
make no contract of a personal nature which would bind her, 
and could bring no suit in her own name. In short, she lost en-
tirely all the legal incidents attaching to a person acting in her 
own right. The husband alone remained sui juris, as fully as 
before marriage. 35 
659 
This "chattel" treatment afforded married women at common law 
began to be changed in a piecemeal fashion in 1839 when Mississippi 
became the first state to abrogate the common law by statutorily 
granting to a married woman control over her own property. 36 One 
hundred and thirty years later, the obsolete common law doctrine had 
almost disappeared from state lawY By 1966, Michigan was the only 
state in the nation with a coverture defense rule applicable to facts . 
such as those presented in the Cardz"llo case.38 Using language that 
sounds timely today a 1935 family law text pronounced: 
It seems needless to suggest that the wife should be given 
the same power to bind herself by contract that the husband 
enjoys. Her common-law immunity from liability on her 
promises was never regarded as a privilege or protection, but 
rather as the natural consequence of a total incapacity. The 
wife neither needs nor desires privilege or protection today. To 
restrict her power to contract upon either theory is hardly con-
sistent with modem standards.39 
As aptly put by the Survey commentator who first reviewed the 
Kloostra case: 
[T]his case presents grist for the feminist movement and the 
proposed equal rights amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. If there is ever to be any meaningful equality be-
tween the sexes. then there must be an equalizing of both 
rights and responsibilities. and sexist decisional grounds such 
35. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91, 92 (1866) . 
. 36. Note, Husband and Wife-Memorandum on the Mississzppi Women:S 
Law of 1839, 42 MICH. L. REv. 1110 (1944). 
37. In 1969, although all states had enacted married women's property 
statutes, eleven states still limited to some degree married women's capacity to con-
tract. See L. KANOWITZ. WOMEN AND THE LAW 55 (1969). 
38. 382 U.S. at 351 n.23. The Texas coverture statute, closely resembling that 
of Michigan, which was the subject matter of the Yazell case before the United States 
Supreme Court had been repealed in 1963. 
39. 3 C. VERNIER. AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 152, at 36 (1935). 
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as those seized upon by the court in this case should be disa-
vowed.40 
The Cardz'llo court has ground the grist of Kloostra by interpreting the 
constitutional provision within the context of 1981 and thus reflecting 
"our modem notions of equal rights for all persons, including those 
who choose to marry."41 
Despite obvious concerns for equality of treatment, several factors 
mitigate the Kloostra position. Historically the wife was permitted to 
protect her separate estate for preservation of her livelihood and that 
of the children. It was feared that the overbearing husband could easi-
ly coerce the subservient wife into signing anything, into entering the 
most risky of business ventures.42 Left to the wife was the responsibility 
of safekeeping certain assets for the ultimate welfare of the family 
unit. 
Today, the coercion is more likely to come from the creditor. The 
realities of the money market make it obvious, without actual 
disclosure, that Shirley Cardillo acted as guarantor on the cement 
mixer lease, because the lender required the same. Furthermore, she 
may have been advised that her separate estate would not be liable for 
the obligation. 
In counseling small business owners, the defense of coverture as to 
the wife's separate estate has doubtless been a consideration of many 
attorneys. Requiring the wife's signature is frequently a routine prac-
tice,43 regardless of whether the enterprise's format is that of sole pro-
prietorship, partnership or closely-held corporation. In Michigan, un-
til Card£llo, the obvious purpose behind requiring the wife's signature 
as surety for the husband's business loan was to create liability as to the 
jointly held assets of the couple. 
The problem that would arise if the Michigan supreme court 
adopted the CardzUo interpretation is the possible retroactive effect of 
such a decision on the signature of those who were counseled to expect 
a contrary legal outcome. The pronouncement of a new rule with far-
reaching effects would be fairest if only prospective in application. 
Historically, retroactivity was the rule of thumb; nevertheless, during 
the past two decades prospective application of decisions has been em-
braced and advocated.44 Prospective application is particularly ap-
40. Revelos, supra note 2, at 327. 
41. 103 Mich. App. at 435, 302 N.W.2d at 892. 
42. See note 36 supra. 
43. It is clearly the practice of federal agencies such as the Small Business Ad-
ministration. 382 U.S. at 345. 
44. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 685-89, 275 N.W.2d 
511, 530-32 (1979)(Coleman, C.]., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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propriate in civil cases such as Cardillo, where the overruling decision 
replaces a rule in existence and utilized for many years.·s 
Although this commentator clearly favors equality, a defense 
which provides protection for family assets held in the wife's name is 
not without merit. The sudden elimination of such protection without 
adequate notice seems particularly troublesome. 
II. EsCROW 
Two cases during the survey period raise questions concerning the 
escrow account, the duties of the escrow agent and interpretation of 
the escrow agreement}6 The first case, although primarily dealing 
with questions concerning USury,·7 addresses perfunctorily the more 
interesting question of whether there is any statutory or common law 
45. [d. at 688, 275 N.W.2d at 532. The court will probably not decide the 
issue of retroactive versus prospective application in the Cardillo case because it is 
unlikely that the issue has been briefed. The application of a new rule is frequendy 
decided in a subsequent case. See, e.g., Murray v. Beyer Memorial Hosp., 409 Mich. 
217, 293 N.W.2d 341 (1980). 
46. The usual definition is that an escrow is a written instrument which by its 
terms imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or 
obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party, to be kept by the depositary until 
the performance of a condition or the happening of a certain event, and then to be 
delivered over to the grantee, promissee, or obligee. While the term escrow originally 
applied only to instruments for the conveyance of land, today almost any writing 
delivered to a third person to hold until the happening of an event or condition can be 
interpreted as an escrow. 28 AM. JUR. 2d Escrow § 1 (1968). Historically, it was ques· 
tioned whether money deposited to be held until the performance of a condition could 
be treated as deposited in escrow. 30A C.J.S. Escrows § 3 (1965). It has now been held 
in Michigan that, in addition to written instruments, money may be the subject of an 
escrow agreement. City Bank & Trust Co. v. Kwaske Bros. Constr. Co., 69 Mich. App. 
271, 274, 244 N.W.2d 443 (1976). The instructions by the parties to the depositary 
concerning the es'crow instrument or monies constitute the escrow agreement. An 
escrow instrument should therefore be differentiated from an escrow agreement. 
47. Although the usury issues raised in the case will be briefly set out in the 
facts, the discussion of the case will concentrate on the escrow agent's duty to deposit 
escrowed monies in interest-bearing accounts. The rationale for this decision is 
twofold. The usury issues discussed are in accordance with Michigan law and usury 
has been covered as a topic in numerous survey issues. See Snider & Rochkind, supra 
note 2, at 302; Snider & Rochkind, Commercial Transactions, 1977 Ann. Survey of 
Mich. LAw, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 319, 346 (1978); Snider, supra note 2, at 435; Dolan, 
Commercial Transactions, 1975 Ann. Survey of Mich. LAw, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 305, 
325 (1976). It should be noted that two other cases involving usury were decided dur-
ing the survey period. Glasner v. Griffin, 102 Mich. App. 445, 301 N.W.2d 889 
(1980); Waldorfv. Zingber, 106 Mich. App. 159, 307 N.W.2d 749 (19~1). The prom-
issory notes in both cases were usurious; the decision in each case ultimately turns on 
issues not specificaIIy germane to commercial transactions. For a thorough discussion 
of usury law in Michigan, see Herstein, Michigan Usury LAw, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 437 
(1981). 
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authority requiring a mortgage lender to place escrowed monies in 
interest-bearing accounts. 
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Kramer,48 the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver of the Birmingham-
Bloomfield Bank, sued defendants on a promissory note. Defendant 
admitted the balance due on the face of the note but contended plain-
tiff must forfeit all of the interest due on the note because various fees 
paid by defendants constituted hidden interest. Defendant asserted 
that when this interest was added to the interest called for by the note, 
an interest rate which was usurious would result. "The trial court found 
and the court of appeals affirmed that the $50 escrow fee and the $500 
service charge constituted hidden interest. In applying the rule that 
hidden interest should be spread over the term of the loan in deter-
mining if the interest rate is usurious, both courts agreed that the in-
terest paid did not exceed the statutory limit of seven percent. 49 
The commitment fee of $850 and the unpaid interest figure, de-
rived by calculating the interest that could have been paid on the 
escrow account, did not constitute hidden interest to the courts. The 
commitment fee did not constitute hidden interest because it involved 
a separate transaction distinct from the loan; the fee bound the lender 
for over one hundred days to loan a stated sum at a stipulated interest 
rate. In denying that the unpaid interest on the escrow account was 
hidden interest the court of appeals stated: "The trial court found no 
statutory or common law authority that required plaintiff to deposit 
escrowed monies in interest bearing accounts. Our search has revealed 
none. The parties agreed in the mortgage that the tax escrow account 
would be a 'non-interest bearing account.' "50 
The blanket statement from the court of appeals opinion that no 
statutory or common law authority can be found to require interest-
bearing escrow accounts is only accurate if the statement refers ex-
clusively to Michigan. Of the three types of escrow methods commonly 
utilized by lending institutions today, the net result of two procedures 
is a profit or interest payment to the mortgagor. 51 The most wide-
spread procedure, on the other hand, authorizes the deposit of escrow 
monies into non-interest bearing accounts which allow the lender to 
commingle the funds and retain any income that is earned by these 
funds. 52 Substantial attacks, primarily led by consumers' groups, have 
48. 100 Mich. App. 495, 299 N.W.2d 387 (1980). 
49. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 438.31 (1978). 
50. 100 Mich. App. at 497,299 N.W.2d at 388. 
51. This is the result where escrow funds are deposited in special savings ac-
counts or where the capitalization method is used. See Comment, Payment of Interest 
on Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 845, 849 (1972). 
52. Id. 850. 
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been mounted against this third method resulting in a significant 
legislative response throughout the country. 53 For approximately ten 
years numerous bills have been introduced in the Michigan legislature 
without enactment. A House Bill54 is currently pending before the 
Consumers Committee which would require mortgagees to pay five 
percent interest on escrowed monies and which would require retroac-
tive application to all mortgage loans in the mortgagee's portfolio. 
This retroactive application requirement, which lenders fmd extreme-
ly troublesome, has been tested and found to be constitutionally sound 
by the United States Supreme Court. 55 
It is not clear from the Kramer opinion how the non -interest bear-
ing escrow account was challenged, or whether it was challenged in 
any context, with the exception of the question of hidden interest. 
While consumer advocates have been quite successful in the legislative 
arena, the same cannot be said of the litigation arena, where numer-
ous legal theories have been tried unsuccessfully. Most of the attacks 
on non-interest bearing escrow accounts have used a trust theory of 
one sort or the other: express trust,56 constructive trust,57 resulting 
53. Several states have enacted legislation requiring that interest be paid to 
mortgagors on escrowed funds. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 2954, 2954.8 (1976 & Supp. 
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49·2(a) (West 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
183, § 61 (West 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.20 (West Supp. 1981); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 384:16·C (Supp. 1979); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14·b (McKinney Supp. 
1980·81); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 86.240, .245 (1979). Although the legislation varies from 
state to state, most statutes require that a specific percentage of interest be paid and 
that the requirement only applies to owner·occupied dwellings. 
54. H. 4679, 81st Leg. Reg. Sess. (1981). 
55. In Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), 
a three·judge federal court panel upheld the New York statutory provision. The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision without opinion. 423 U.S. 802 
(1975). 
56. An important case which made use of the express trust theory was 
Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank, 362 Mass. 770, 291 N.E.2d 609 (1973), 
where the Massachusetts Supreme Court breathed life into the theory by determining 
that the mortgagor's complaint stated a cause of action in trust. The bubble burst 
three years later when the same court determined that the trial court was correct in 
concluding that there was no manifestation of intention to create a trust. The net 
result, at least in Massachusetts, appears to be a requirement that the escrow agree-
ment of the parties use trust language. Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank, 370 
Mass. 314, 326, 346 N.E.2d 892, 900 (1976). For other unsuccessful cases, see Brooks 
v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 113 Ariz. 169, 548 P.2d 1166 (1976); Tuckerv. Pulaski Fed. Say. 
& Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Lathrop v. Bell Fed. Say. & 
Loan Ass'n, 42 Ill. App. 3d 183, 355 N.E.2d 667 (1976); Surrey Strathmore Corp. v. 
Dollar Say. Bank, 36 N.Y.2d 173, 325 N.E.2d 527, 366 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1975); 
Richman v. SecuritySav. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Wis. 2d358, 204N.W.2d 5f1 (1973). Even 
when a court is willing to recognize an express trust relationship, language in the 
agreement may negate the payment of interest. See Marsh v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan 
Ass'n, 66 Cal. App. 3d 674, 136 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1977). 
57. Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 
117 (1974) (only case recognizing a constructive trust theory). 
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trust. 58 With the notable exception of a Pennsylvania case endorsing 
both constructive trust and express trust theories,59 the "trust theories" 
have been ineffectual. One of the most creative theories utilized suc-
cessfully was a pledge theory in a Utah Supreme Court case. 60 The 
decision is probably not of precedential value, however, since the 
court seemed to place great emphasis on the language of pledge used 
in the agreement. 
Since neither case law nor statute requires that escrow accounts be 
interest-bearing at the present time in Michigan, the only way to 
receive interest on escrowed monies is by express authorization in the 
escrow agreement. 
Interpretation of an escrow agreement and the corresponding du-
ties of the escrow agent are the issues raised In the second case. In 
Starboard Tack Corp. v. Meister,61 plaintiffs entered into an escrow 
agreement with Meister whereby defendant Allen, Meister's attorney, 
as escrow agent, would hold and retain certain money pending the sale 
of a restaurant. If Meister defaulted on the contract of sale, the agent, 
Allen, was required to deliver the escrowed monies to plaintiffs. The 
escrow agreement stated that Allen acknowledged the receipt of such 
money and that the same was "on deposit" in a bank account. 
Meister defaulted, a default judgment was entered against him, 
and plaintiffs demanded the escrow fund from Allen. Allen refused 
because the check received from Meister for the fund had been dis-
honored. Plaintiffs sued and as an affirmative defense Allen alleged 
that Meister's check, given at the time the escrow agreement was ex-
ecuted, was post-dated. 62 Therefore, according to Allen, all of the 
parties knew that the money was not "on deposit" when the escrow 
agreement was executed. The trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs. 
The court of appeals' opinion in Starboard Tack rejected plain-
tiffs' contention that the phrase, "is on deposit," was a guarantee by 
Allen of Meister's check. Although the court's opinion that the agree-
ment merely made Allen an escrow agent, and not a guarantor of 
Meister's check, is supportable, there was no citation to any authority. 
Allen did not sign Meister's check and therefore did not become an ac-
58. See Comment, Tax and Insurance Escrow Accounts tn Mortgages- The 
Attack Presses On, 41 Mo. L. REv. 133, 136 (1976). 
59. 457 Pa. at 143, 320 A.2d at 123. 
60. Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 
1977). 
61. 103 Mich. App. 557, 303 N.W.2d 38 (1981). 
62. Attached to his affirmative defenses, Allen included a copy of Meister's 
check dated January 29, 1978,46 days after the escrow agreement was dated, 19 days 
after the plaintiffs aver that it was actually signed. Id. at 560-61, 303 N.W.2d at 39. 
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commodation party or guarantor.63 To the contrary, Allen merely 
acknowledged receipt of the Iponey pursuant to the terms of the 
escrow agreement. An escrow agent, although bound by the agree-
ment, is in no sense an insurer nor is he responsible for defects in the-
property or instrument held in escrow.6i An escrow agent is not "a 
guarantor or insurer of the title. Its duty [is] only to exercise due care 
to carry out the terms of the escrow agreement .... "65 By analogy, an 
escrow agent should not be held to be a guarantor of a negotiable in-
strument; the agent should not be responsible for the defect in the in-
strument, but instead, should be potentially liable for a breach of the 
agent's contractual duties pursuant to the agreement. 
Such a decision does not absolve Allen ofliability, since an escrow 
agent can violate his duties by mere negligence. The agent owes a duty 
to the parties to prudently carry out the responsibilities set forth in the 
agreement and if negligent may be held liable for subsequent 
defects. 66 However, if the wrongful or negligent act is ratified by the 
injured party, the escrow agent will not be liable.67 In the instant case, 
the plaintiffs might be said to have ratified Allen's negligence, since 
they knew the post-dated check could not possibly have been on 
deposit and they did not objectJ. 
Starboard Tack is the first case in Michigan to expressly establish 
as a rule of law what had been impliedly established,68 that the duties 
and liabilities of the escrow agent are governed by the escrow agree-
ment. That the escrow agreement constitutes the full measure of obli-
gations assumed by the agent and owed to the parties is a fixed rule of 
63. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 440.3415-.3416 (1967). 
64. "The [escrow] holder acts as a depositary, and is not concerned with nor 
responsible for defects in the title to the property." Barron v. Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 
97 Idaho 305, 311, 543 P.2d 858, 864 (1975), quoting Foreman v. Todd, 83 Idaho 
482,486, 364 P.2d 365, 367 (1961). 
65. Texas Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Security Title Co., 352 S.W.2d 347, 351 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
66. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Security Title Ins. Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 626, 
629, 50 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726 (1966); HoImes v. McKey, 383 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1963). 
67. 352 S.W.2d at 351; Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Horwath, 41 Ariz. 417, 
429, 19 P.2d 82, 86 (1933). 
68. The early case of Ripley v. Lucas, 267 Mich. 682, 255 N.W. 356 (1934), 
addressed the impact of the agreement on the parties, and can be applied by analogy 
to the escrow agent. In Ripley, the court held that the escrow could not be revoked ex-
cept according to the terms of the agreement, recognizing that the escrow agreement 
controls the rights and duties of the parties. More closely on point is the case of Rose 
Sales Co. v. Shafer, 41 Mich. App. 105, 199 N.W.2d 655 (1972), wherein the escrow 
agent refused to turn escrowed monies over to the plaintiff because the judgment en-
titling plaintiff to the monies was being appealed. The court of appeals ruled that 
plaintiffs notification to the agent of its rights, satisfying a condition of the escrow 
agreement, immediately fixed the duties of the escrow_The court thereby implied that 
the agent's duties were totally governed by the agreement. 
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law throughout the country.69 Nevertheless, any action taken by the 
escrow agent outside that authorized by the escrow agreement may 
result in liability on the part of the agent, since the escrow holder's 
liability is both fIxed and limited by the agreement. 70 
The central question in Starboard Tack is not whether the escrow 
agreement governs-the court pronounces as a rule of law that it 
does-but the interpretation of the agreement and the consequential 
impact upon the duties of the agent. The court of appeals recognized 
that the duties and liabilities of the agent were governed by the agree-
ment, but pursuant to universally recognized rules of construction 
stated that such agreement must be construed to effectuate the intent 
of the parties. Furthermore, the court ruled that the agreement was 
ambiguous and thus the surrounding facts and circumstances were 
considered for the purpose of aiding in construction. 71 Such facts and 
circumstances revealed plaintiffs' knowledge of the actual situation 
and estopped them from holding the agent liable. The court used 
standard contract interpretation principles rather than case law deal-
69. See, e.g., Malta v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 76 Ariz. 116,259 P.2d 554 
(1953); Blackburn v. McCoy, 1 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 P.2d 153 (1934); Glick v. Galier, 
116 Ohio St. 41, 155 N.E. 385 (1927). Furthennore, the escrow agent is not under a 
duty to go beyond the escrow instructions. See, e.g., Lee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 264 
Cal. App. 2d 160, 70 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1968), where plaintiffs sued the agent for failure 
to infonn plaintiffs of certain illicit transactions surrounding the purchase of a parcel 
of real estate and the court denied recovery. An escrow agent is not under a fiduciary 
duty to go beyond the tenns of the agreement and notify each party of any suspicious 
fact or circumstance. 
70. See Loyd v. Southwest Underwriters, 50 N.M. 66, 169 P.2d 238 (1946). 
71. Although truly a topic for discussion in the survey article on contracts, use 
by the court of the plain meaning rule calls for comment. This rule, that ambiguity 
must be found on the face of a writing before extrinsic evidence is admissible for pur-
poses ofimerpretation, is rejected by the comments to the U.C.C., and by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, although it is unfortunately still part of Michigan 
jurisprudence. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.2202 (1967); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS §§ 200-04 (1981). Fortunately, U.C.C. § 2-202 has been properly con-
strued by the court of appeals to denounce the requirement of a finding of ambiguity 
in order for the contract's tenns to be supplemented or explained by parol or other ex-
trinsic evidence related to course of perfonnance, course of dealing or usage of trade. 
See Michigan Bean Co. v. Senn, 93 Mich. App. 440, 446, 287 N.W.2d 257, 260~61 
(1979). The Michigan supreme court has been given an opportunity to adopt the 
Restatement Second provisions dealing with interpretation in a case argued before the 
court in January of this year. See Kassin v. Arc-Mation, Inc., 94 Mich. App. 520, 228 
N.W.2d 413 (1979), leave to appeal granted, 409 Mich. 868 (1980). In that case the 
court of appeals mixed together the questions of integration and interpretation by 
combining the face of the document and plain meaning tests to arrive at its result de-
nying admission of all extrinsic evidence as to both questions. Even if the Michigan 
supreme court finds the stock purchase agreement to be a complete integration, the 
court should be willing to admit all extrinsic evidence for purposes of interpreting the 
agreement. 
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ing with escrow agreements. However, in at least one escrow case, a 
court held that the conduct of the parties in actually handling the 
escrow fund may be helpful in interpreting the requirements of the 
escrow agreement. 72 
The court of appeals' opinion mentions several cases from other 
jurisdictions factually similar to Starboard Tack and declares them 
distinguishable. In Wade v. Lake County Title Co., 73 the parties had 
entered into an agreement for the sale and purchase of a walnut 
grove. An escrow agreement was entered into, and a $115,000 check 
was deposited with the escrow. Attached to the check deposited by the 
purchasers was a note which stated "do not deposit." The seller did 
not know of this note nor was the agent instructed, in the escrow 
agreement or otherwise, to deposit the check. The agent did not de-
posit the check and the purchasers refused to complete the purchase. 
The c~urt, holding the escrow agent liable, stated: 
Although the instructions of the parties contained no 
direction that the check be deposited, an escrow agent, in the 
exercise of ordinary diligence would not hold a check for the 
length of time shown here [4 months] without checking to see 
whether the purchaser had sufficient funds on deposit, and 
'without advising the vendors that the check had not been 
deposited. 74 
Thus, the court in Wade held the agent liable, even though the agent 
had express instructions not to deposit the check. The facts in Star-
board Tack as presented by the court of appeals are inadequate for 
determining whether liability could be based upon unreasonable delay 
in presenting the check for payment after the post-dated check be-
came a demand instrument. If Allen did unreasonably delay, the 
Wade case and a Nebraska case, Katleman v. U.S. Communz"ties, 
Inc. ,75 would potentially change the result in Starboard Tack. 
In the Katleman case, the purchaser deposited with the escrow a 
$25,000 draft payable to the order of the escrow agent, to be forfeited 
to the seller if the purchaser defaulted. The draft was never cashed 
and the purchaser defaulted. The Nebraska court found that the es-
crow agent had breached a duty by holding the draft instead of 
cashing it. The court found several factors which supported 'its posi-
tion: the check was payable to the order of the agent, which evidenced 
a duty to cash the check; the receipt acknowledged that the agent held 
72. See Lloyd v. McDonald County Bank, 591 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
73. 6 Cal. App. 3d 824, 86 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1970). 
74. Id. at 829, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (citation omitted). 
75. 197 Neb. 443, 249 N.W.2d 898 (1977). 
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"a good and sufficient draft in the amount of $25,000;"76 and the 
terms of the escrow agreement held the escrow to "strict compliance" 
therewith. In addition the court proclaimed that, "[a]n undue or 
unreasonable delay in presenting the draft for payment would be neg-
ligence which might give rise to liability to the principals for any 
resulting loss. "77 
The knowledge of the plaintiffs in Starboard Tack that the check 
was not "on deposit" when the escrow agreement was executed would 
not be decisive under Katleman. The Katleman court was not con-
cerned with plaintiffs knowledge of whether or not the draft had been 
cashed but with the escrow agent's negligence in unreasonably delay-
ing presentment of the draft. A lack of timeliness on Allen's part in 
presentment of Meister's check after January 29 could definitely 
reverse the court of appeals' decision if the Katleman case was fol-
lowed rather than distinguished. 
This commentator finds the case which the Starboard Tack court 
relies heavily upon, Wz"llz"ams v. Northsz'de Realty Assodates, Inc., 78 
easily distinguishable. In Wz"llz"ams, the escrow agent received a $5,000 
deposit check from a prospective real estate purchaser. Unbeknownst 
to the seller, the broker had agreed with the purchaser that he would 
not cash the check until he was informed that it would clear. The 
broker was never notified, the money was never deposited, and the 
purchaser refused to go through with the sale. The Georgia court 
denied liability as to the agent finding that the agreement placed no 
obligation or duty upon the agent to cash the check. The Wz"ll£ams 
court placed specific emphasis upon the lack of any language in the 
agreement which would impose a duty upon the agent to place the 
funds "on deposit." The opposite is clearly the case in Starboard Tack 
where the agreement specifically provided that the money was "on 
deposit." 
Although undoubtedly deciding the case correctly on equitable 
grounds, the court in Starboard Tack appears to be declaring one rule 
and following another. By following the rule that an escrow agent's 
duties are governed by the agreement, the court could probably have 
properly found the agent liable, particularly considering that he also 
was the attorney for the drawer of the check, Meister. The case should 
not be interpreted as negating an escrow agent's duty to make timely 
presentment and deposit of escrow funds. 
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
A court of appeals' opinion from the survey period addresses the 
76. [d. at 448, 249 N.W.2d at 90l. 
77. [d. 
78. 116 Ga. App. 253, 157 S.E.2d 166 (1967). 
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often troublesome issue of what language can be added to the face of 
an instrument without affecting its negotiability. Of the requirements 
set forth in U.C.C. section 3-104(1),79 defining a negotiable instru-
ment, one of the most actively litigated80 is the requirement that the 
'writing contain an unconditional promise or order to pay and no other 
promise or order except as authorized by Article 3.81 
In Standard Federal Savings & Loan Associatz"on v. Cz"tzzens In-
surance Co. of America, 82 the plaintiff, Standard Federal, cashed a 
$4450 check drawn by the defendant, Citizens Insurance, and issued it 
to its name insured who had reported her automobile stolen. Subse-
quent to issuing the check, Citizens Insurance became aware that the 
report of the stolen automobile was fraudulent and ordered the draw-
ee of the check, First National Bank of Howell, to stop payment. 83 
When the plaintiff, a holder in due course,84 presented the check for 
payment, the payor bank85 r-efused final payment and honored the 
drawer's stop payment order. Plaintiff instituted the instant action to 
recover payment on the instrument based upon defendant-drawer's 
contract of secondary liability. 86 
79. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.3104(1) (1967) provides: 
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in 
money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker 
or drawer except as authorized by this Article; and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer. 
80. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-4, at 554 (1980). 
81. For exact language of MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.3104(1)(b), see note 
79 supra. 
82. 99 Mich. App. 338, 297 N.W.2d 656 (1980), leave to appeal denied, 410 
Mich. 906 (1981). 
83. Stop payment orders and whether t~e drawee bank can charge a fee for ex-
ecuting them are the subject matter of one of the attorney general opinions from the 
survey period reviewed in the text at note 127 infra. 
84. "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (a) for value; 
and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored 
or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person." MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 440.3302(1) (1967). 
85. Once an instrument or item is within.the bank collection process, which is 
the subject matter of Article 4 of the U.C.C., the drawee bank is referred to as the 
payor bank. See id. § 44O.4105(b). 
86. The drawer of a draft or check is a secondary party. Id. § 440.3102(1)(d). 
The drawer in signing the instrument orders the drawee bank to pay and expects that 
the payee will look first to the drawee bank for payment. Contractually, we say the 
drawer is secondarily liable because if the drawee refuses to pay and dishonors the in-
strument then: "The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any 
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Since the plaintiff was a holder in due course of the dishonored in-
strument the personal defense of fraud in the inducement,87 drawer's 
justification for stopping payment, was inoperative. Thus, having no 
real defense to raise to plaintiffs action on the instrument, defendant-
drawer argued that the instrument was non-negotiable, there being no 
holder in due course status for non-negotiable instruments. 
Accordingly, the issue presented was whether the language on the 
face of the instrument, "Upon acceptance pay to the order of' renders 
the instrument conditional and non-negotiable. The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court, correctly deciding that the instrument was 
not made conditional but was negotiable. 
Although the court discussed patent ambiguity and principles of 
construction,88 the case can easily be decided on the basis of a V.C.C. 
provision quoted in the opinion: "The negotiability of an instrument is 
not affected by ... a term in the draft providing that the payee by in-
dorsing or cashing it acknowledges full satisfaction of an obligation of 
the drawer . . . . "89 The "upon acceptance" language used on the face 
of the instrument acknowledged satisfaction of the insurance claim, 
that the instrument was given in settlement of an insurance policy. 
While it is true that this is an issue of first impression for a Michigan 
court,90 courts throughout the country faced with similar facts and 
"upon acceptance" language have consistently held that the draft re-
mains negotiable. 91 As found by the court, the check was made 
payable to the insured "in full settlement and satisfaction of any claim 
she had regarding her allegedly stolen automobile. From this context, 
necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to the 
holder or to any indorser who takes it up." [d. § 440.3413(2). 
87. Although personal defenses are not listed in the Code provisions, fraud in 
the inducement is acknowledged as a personal defense, and involves any situation 
where a drawer relies on fraudulent representations and knowingly issues a negotiable 
instrument based upon that reliance. In the instant case the insurance company, the 
drawer, relied upon the fraudulent representation of its insured that her automobile 
had been stolen, and knowingly issued a check to compensate for the insurance claims. 
The real defense involving fraud, good as against a holder in due course, is fraud in 
the factum or fraud in the execution and it is codified in the U.C.C. See MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. § 440.3305(2)(c), Comment 7 (1967); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 
80, § 14-9, at 573. 
88. 99 Mich. App. at 344-46, 297 N.W.2d at 658-59. 
89. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.3112(1)(f) (1967). For other terms and 
omissions not affecting negotiability the entire statutory provision should be consulted. 
90. 99 Mich. App. at 343,297 N.W.2d at 658. 
91. See, e.g., Canal Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 266 Ark. 1044, 596 S.W.2d 
710 (1979); Lialois v. Home Ins. Cos., 87 Ill. App. 3d 240, 410 N.E.2d 193 (1980); 
Falk's Food Basket of Easton, Inc. v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 522, 
257 A.2d 359 (1969). 
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it is justifiable to conclude that the language 'upon acceptance' was an 
explicit reference to the transactz"on which resulted in the making of 
this draft."92 
The argument of defendant-drawer that "upon acceptance" was a 
term of art requiring acceptance by the drawee bank before payment, 
although courteously addressed by the court,93 is totally unsupport-
able. The U.C.C. provision cited by defendant defines an 
acceptance,94 which creates a drawee's contract of primary liability. 
Certification of a check is acceptance.95 The argument that a check 
must be accepted in order to be negotiable is frivolous. Acceptance 
merely creates a contract of liability for the drawee and discharges 
other parties to the instrument from potential liability. 
Frivolous defenses to payment were apparently abundant in nego-
tiable instrument cases this survey period as evidenced by the case of 
Liberty State Bank & Trust v. Hemisphere Development Group, Inc. 96 
In Liberty State Bank, the plaintiff was the assignee holder of a prom-
issory note executed by the defendant. At a time prior to default by 
the defendant, the plaintiff added $8,095.19 to its ledger card on 
defendant's note, the addition representing a separate debt obligation 
allegedly owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. When defendant 
defaulted on the note payments and plaintiff started suit, defendant 
denied any liability on the account based upon the defense of material 
alteration. Defendant claimed that the addition to the ledger card was 
a material alteration of the loan obligation discharging defendant's 
entire obligation under the loan agreement. 97 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, correctly holding 
92. 99 Mich. App. at 344-45, 297 N.W.2d at 659 (emphasis in original). 
93. [d. at 342-44, 297 N.W.2d at 658-59. 
94. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.3410(1) (1967) provides: "Acceptance is 
the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented. It must be written on 
the draft, and may consist of his signature alone. It becomes operative when com-
pleted by delivery or notification." 
95. See id. § 440.3411(1). 
96. 98 Mich. App. 285, 296 N.W.2d 241 (1980). 
97. The claimed defense of material alteration is set forth in MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. § 440.3407 (1967). It reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the con-
tract of any party thereto in any respect . . . . 
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course 
(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material 
discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed unless ~hat party 
assents or is precluded from asserting the defense; 
(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument may be 
enforced according to its original tenor, or as to incomplete instruments ac-
cording to the authority given. 
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that defendant's material alteration argument was without merit. A 
material alteration of an instrument will, under some circumstances, 98 
discharge a party whose contractual liability is therefore changed. 
However, the materially altered instrument must be negotiable;99 the 
ledger card is clearly not a negotiable instrument. loo The court of ap-
peals correctly ruled, in one of the more amusing "material alteration" 
cases, that the plaintiffs addition to the ledger card in no way 
mitigated or discharged defendant's obligation to pay pursuant to the 
previous promissory note obligation. 
IV. BAILMENT 
The case of Indemnity Marine Assurance Co. v. Lipin Robznson 
Warehouse Corp., 101 has the distinction of being the first in the coun-
tryl02 to address the question of whether section 7-204(1) of Article 7 
of the U.C.C. includes in recovery for "loss of or injury to the goods"103 
an allowance for consequential damages in the form of lost profits. In 
Lipzn Robznson, the plaintiffs, the bailor and bailor's subrogee, sued 
the defendant bailee for damages caused by the bailee's improper 
storage and handling of the bailor's goods. The court found that 
defendant bailee was a warehouseman as defined by Article 7,104 ir-
98. In order to discharge a party's contractual obligation, the alteration to the 
negotiable instrument must be both material and fraudulent, and even then the 
alteration is not good as against a subsequent holder in due course. A subsequent 
holder in due course may enforce the instrument according to its original tenor. See 
note 97 supra. 
99. Definitionally, instrument means negotiable instrument wherever used in 
Article 3 of the V.C.C. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.3102(1)(e) (1967). 
100. In order to be negotiable a writing must satisfy the statutory requirements. 
See id. § 440.3104(1), set forth at note 79 supra. The ledger card does not comply with 
any of the requirements. 
101. 99 Mich. App. 6, 297 N.W.2d 846 (1980). 
102. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 80, § 20·3, at 792. While no cases 
concerning warehousemen have addressed the question, for a case denying recovery of 
lost profits to a carrier, see Lowes Glove Co. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 
429, 282 N. Y .S.2d 869 (1967). In order to recover lost profits, the carrier had to be ap-
prised of the resale situation and had to actually or impliedly accept the consequence 
of failing to timely deliver. The standard appears to be one of tacit agreement and not 
one of foreseeability. See note no infra. 
103. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.7204(1) (1967) provides: 
A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the goods 
caused by his failure to exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably 
careful man would exercise under like circumstances but unless otherwise 
agreed he is not liable for damages which could not have been avoided by the 
exercise of such care. 
104. A warehouseman is a person engaged in the business of storing goods for 
hire. [d. § 440.7102(1)(h). The definitional provision does not require the issuance of 
a document of title. 
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respective of whether warehouse receipts had been issued. This deci-
sion was necessitated by an unclear record in the lower court concern-
ing whether warehouse receipts or other documents were issued by 
Lipin Robinson. 
Case law authority is practically non-existent concerning this ques-
tion of whether warehouse receipts must be issued in order to apply 
Article 7. In the one case which applied Article 7 where a warehouse 
receipt was not issued, the marina was held to be a warehouse but the 
marina's lien failed for lack of the warehouse receipt. lOS Notably, 
treatise writers White and Summers appear to support the court's ap-
plication of Article 7 in this factual setting. lOS 
In deciding the question of first impression, the court of appeals 
held that lost profits, as a form of consequential damages, are recov-
erable under Article 7. The plaintiffs were not entitled to such a 
recovery, however, since they could not establish, with reasonable cer-
tainty, a right to the award. In arriving at this result the court stated: 
No Michigan cases exist which are precisely on point with 
the instant situation. However, case law from other jurisdic-
tions suggests the lost profits are rarely an appropriate item of 
damages in a bailment situation. The cases indicate that, for 
profits to be included as a loss item in a bailment contract, the 
bailee must have been fully apprised of the fact that the items 
were for resale and that the goods could not otherwise be pro-
cured in the market. 107 
The decision of the court that lost profits are available under Arti-
cle 7 as consequential damages is based upon the opinion of treatise 
writers and not upon explicit statutory authority. lOS It should be noted 
that the standard for evaluating the availability of consequential 
105. Richwagen v. Lilienthal, 386 So. 2d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
106. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 80, § 20-2, at 785. 
107. 99 Mich. App. at 13-14, 297 N.W.2d at 850-5!. 
108. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 80, § 20-3, at 792, wherein it is 
stated: 
Section 7-204(1) of Article Seven allows recovery for "loss of or injury to 
the goods," language which does not expressly allow recovery for consequen-
tial damages in the fonn of lost profits. Suppose, for example, that the 
market value of plaintiffs goods is $10,000 at the time they are destroyed 
and that the plaintiff had contracted to resell them for $12,000. A recovery 
limited by the language of section 7-204(1) to merely $10,000 would not 
always make the plaintiff whole. There are no Code cases either way. We 
think the plaintiff should recover consequential damages in a proper case, 
and we would cite not only 1-103 and general law allowing recovery of conse-
quential damages, but also 1-106 which provides that remedies are to be 
liberally administered. 
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damages is set forth in a buyer's remedy provision of Article 2.109 The 
Code comments to that provision clearly provide that the tacit agree-
ment test for recovery of consequential damages is rejected and the 
"reason to know" test,110 the foreseeability test of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale, III is the standard for determining the liability for consequential 
damages. It appears, however, that the cases referred to by the court 
of appeals in the instant case for determining damages in a bailment 
situation use both the tacit agreement test and the foreseeability 
test. 11Z 
In another bailment case decided during the survey period, the 
court of appeals discussed the differences between the two procedures 
available for enforcement of a warehouseman's lien. In Scott v. Hurd-
Corrz"gan Movz"ng & Storage Co., 113 the plaintiff stored household 
goods with defendant. When plaintiff failed to make monthly storage 
payments, defendant executed a warehouseman's lien and sold plain-
tiffs stored goods. The court of appeals held that defendant failed to 
comply with the explicit notice requirements of Article 7. 
Under the Code a warehouseman has a lien on goods covered by a 
document of title for reasonable expenses necessary in preservation of 
the goods or incurred in the sale of the goods, and for storage, 
transportation, insurance and labor. 114 The procedure for enforce-
ment of the lien varies depending upon the status of the bailor. If the 
bailor is a merchant,115 the lien enforcement procedure used by the 
109. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.2715(2)(a) (1967) which provides: 
"(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss 
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at 
the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be 
prevented by cover or otherwise." 
1l0. For a thorough discussion of the background and application of the two 
tests in a different context, see Stone, Recovery of Consequential Damages for Product 
Recall Expenditures, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 485, 489-94. 
llI. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). Hadley is the classic article 7 case where the 
carrier failed to promptly deliver the steammill's broken shaft. 
112. For application of the tacit agreement test in addition to the Lowes Glove 
case discussed at note 102 supra, see Greenberg Bros. v. Hahn, 246 Cal. App. 2d 529, 
54 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1966) (conceivably applying both tests simultaneously). The only 
case cited by the court in which lost profits were awarded was Groendyke Transp., 
Inc. v. Merchant, 380 P.2d 682 (Okla. 1963). It is impossible to determine from the 
reported opinion what test the Oklahoma court used. The syllabus by the court, 
before the reported opinion, uses language of the foreseeability test. 
113. 103 Mich. App. 322, 302 N.W.2d 867 (1981). 
114. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.7209(1) (1967). 
115. Id. § 440.2104(1) defines a merchant as "a person who deals in goods ofthe 
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices o,r goods involved in the transaction or to whom such 
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other 
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or 
skill." 
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bailee is rather flexible since it is based upon the all-encompassing 
standard of commercial reasonableness. 116 
Alternatively, the lien enforcement procedure for goods stored by 
a nonmerchant is expressed in mandatory language and is strict in its 
requirements. ll7 The court of appeals properly ruled that the focus is 
on the bailor of the goods, not upon the bailee, in determining 
whether the goods were stored by a merchant. The court found the 
bailor to be a non-merchant; strict compliance by the bailee with the 
statutory requirements was, therefore, necessary. 118 
Mter determining that the plaintiff was entitled to a summary 
judgment on the question of liability because of defendant bailee's 
116. See id. § 440.7210(1). 
117. 1d. § 440.7210 provides in pan: 
(2) A warehouseman's lien on goods other than goods stored by a mer-
chant in the course of his business may be enforced only as follows: 
(a) All persons known to claim an interest in the goods must be 
notified. 
(b) The notification must be delivered in person or sent by 
registered or cenified letter to the last known address of any 
person to be notified. 
(c) The notification must include an itemized statement of the 
claim, a description of the goods subject to the lien, a de-
mand for payment within a specified time not less than 10 
days after receipt of the notification, and a conspicuous state-
ment that unless the claim is paid within that time the goods 
will be advenised for sale and sold by auction at a specified 
time and place. 
(d) The sale must conform to the terms of the notification. 
(e) The sale must be held at the nearest suitable place to that 
where the goods are held or stored. 
(f) Mter the expiration of the time given in the notification, an 
advenisement of the sale must be published once a week for 2 
weeks consecutively in a newspaper of general circulation 
where the sale is to be held. The advenisement must include 
a description of the goods, the name of the person on whose 
account they are being held, and the time and place of the 
sale. The sale must take place at least 15 days after the first 
publication. If there is no newspaper of general circulation 
where the sale is to be held, the advenisement must be posted 
at least 10 days before the sale in not less than 6 conspicuous 
places in the neighborhood of the proposed sale. 
118. Strict statutory compliance with the provisions governing sale of a 
nonmerchant-bailor's goods is required throughout the country. See, e.g., Rubin v. 
City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 81 lli. App. 3d 1020, 402 N.E.2d 281 (1980); 
Kellenberger v. Bob Meyers Moving & Storage Co., 595 P.2d 1229 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1979). "The enforcement of such lien under summary foreclosure procedures, must be 
accomplished in strict compliance with the terms of the statute upon which the power 
is granted." Flores v. Diedear Van & Storage Co., 489 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex. Civ. 
App.1972). 
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failure to strictly comply with the statutory notice provisions, the court 
was asked to rule that failure to comply constitutes conversion based 
upon the following Code language: "The warehouseman is liable for 
damages caused by failure to comply with the requirements for sale 
under this section and in case of willful violation is liable for conver-
sion."1l9 
The court held that a willful violation "implies a knowing con-
scious noncompliance with the statute or a deliberate unwillingness to 
discover and obey the law."120 Accordingly, the court found that a 
directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of conversion 
would be improper. This finding is contrary to decisions from other 
jurisdictions which hold that failure to comply with the requirements 
of Article 7 in the sale of a consumer's stored property is conversion, 
regardless of willfulness. 121 These sister-state decisions either ignore 
the "and" language of the statutory provision122 or imply willfulness 
whenever a bailee fails to strictly comply with the statutory re-
quirements. 
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
Default Under Article Nine 
Heyboer v. Kolberg123 discusses the right of a junior secured 
creditor to notice of a default sale held by the senior secured creditor. 
The case is not of substantial jurisprudential significance except for 
the opportunity it provides to examine the difference between the 
1962 and 1972 provisions of Article 9 as related to junior secured 
creditors. 124 Although the 1972 amendments became effective in 
Michigan in January of 1979,125 no reported Michigan case has as yet 
dealt with the change in the notice provisions. The Heyboer case pro-
vides an opportunity to at least briefly examine cases from other 
jurisdictions that have applied the 1972 provisions. 
119. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.7210(9) (1967). 
120. 103 Mich. App. at 339,302 N.W.2d at 874. The Michigan coun appeared 
to base its opinion upon the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Long's Transfer & 
Storage V. Busby, 358 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1978). 
121. See, e.g., Suddath Moving & Storage CO. V. Roure, 276 So. 2d 549, 550 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Kellenberger y. Bob Meyers Moving & Storage Co., 595 
P.2d 1229, 1232 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); Flores V. Diedear Van & Storage Co., 489 
S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
122. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.7210(9) (1967), set fonh in the text at 
note 119 supra. 
123. 493 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
124. In Heyboer, the 1962 provision was controlling because the sale took place 
prior to the 1979 revision in Michigan. See note 125 infra. 
125. No. 369, § 1, [1978] Mich. Pub. Acts. 
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In Heyboer, a fanner defaulted on his secured loan to the Fanners 
Home Administration and pursuant to that Administration's pennis-
sion, conducted an auction sale of personalty relating to his fanning 
operation, including the sale of a 1973 tractor. Peoples Bank and 
Trust Company had a perfected security interest in the tractor, junior 
to the security interest of the Administration, but received no notice of 
the auction until eight months after the sale. Peoples Bank was enti-
tled to receive notification of the pending sale from the senior secured 
party pursuant to the following statutory language: 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline 
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recog-
nized market, reasonable notijz"catz"on of the tz"me and place of 
any pubHc sale or reasonable notification of the time after 
which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be 
made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and ex-
cept in the case of consumer goods to any other person who 
has a security z"nterest Z1£ the collateral and who has duly fz"led a 
ft1£andng statement z1£dexed z"n the name of the debtor Z1£ tMs 
state or who is known by the secured party to have a security 
interest in the collateral.126 
Failure to give notification resulted in liability on the part of the 
Administration to Peoples Bank for "any loss caused by a failure [of 
the secured party] to comply with the provisions .... "127 The federal 
district court properly held that the Administration was liable to 
Peoples Bank for the outstanding loan obligation secured by the trac-
tor, plus interest and costS. 128 
The 1972 amendment altered the notice requirements as to junior 
secured parties with the following substituted language: "In other 
cases notiji·catz"on shall be sent to any other secured party from whom 
the secured party has recez"ved (before sending his notification to the 
debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) wrz"tten notz"ce 
of a claz"m of z"nterest Z1£ the collateral. "129 The change was intended to 
place the "burden on junior secured parties of notifying the senior 
secured party of their existence, rather than on the senior party to 
126. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.9504(3) (1967) (emphasis added). 
127. Id. § 440.9507(1). 
128. This decision, applying the 1962 notice provisions of Anicle 9, confonns 
with applications in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Transpon Equip. Co. v. Guaranty 
State Bank, 518 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1975); Bank of Camilla v. Stephens, 234 Ga. 293, 
216 S.E.2d 71 (1975). 
129. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.9504(3) (Supp. 1980-81) (emphasis 
added). 
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search for junior parties. "130 According to the amendment's drafters, 
the "burdens of searching the record and of checking the secured par-
ty's files were greater than the circumstances called for because as a 
practical matter there would seldom be a junior secured party who 
really had an interest needing protection in the case of a foreclosure 
sale. "131 
The question of what is the earliest point in time at which the 
junior secured party can give written notice of a claim of interest to 
the senior secured party, and preserve a right to notification of sale 
following default, is an open one. A member of the Article 9 review 
committee, in an early review of the changed provision, indicated that 
the junior secured party could meet the burden by giving written 
notice to the senior secured party as soon as the junior party acquired 
a security interest. 132 This appears to be the logical import of the 
statutory language, however, it does not alter the burden of the senior 
secured party to check his files. Additionally, the senior secured party 
is required to maintain accurate records of all written notifications 
concerning an individual file from the time the file becomes active. 
The few reported cases which have been decided with reference to 
the 1972 amendment have not directly addressed this issue. 133 In-
terestingly, at least one case justified potential recovery for a junior 
secured party where written notice of a claim of interest in the col-
lateral was not sent to the senior secured party. 134 
130. See Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 27 Bus. LAW. 321, 347 (1971). 
131. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1978 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, app. 
II, § 9-504, at 986 (reasons for 1972 change). 
132. Funk, supra note 130, at 347. 
133. In Food City, Inc. v. Fleming Co., 590 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979), 
the court addressed the question of whether certain documents in a senior secured par-
ty's file gave notice of the junior secured party's interest. The documents included 
copies of insurance binders, a computerized accounts payable summary, and a bill of 
sale inconspicuously referring to the junior secured party's interest. The Texas court 
held that none of the documents constituted the type of written notice intended by the 
statute. A junior secured party should send written notice which specifically asserts a 
subordinate interest in the collateral and which requests notification prior to any sale 
or disposition of the property. [d. 760-6l. 
The one case which dealt specifically with the timeliness of written notice involved 
notice by the junior secured party two years after repossession by the senior secured 
party. Since both parties had acted improperly, the court in Blackhawk Prod. Credit 
Ass'n v. Meridian Implement Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d. 93, 402 N.E.2d 277 (1980) weighed 
the equities and held that the junior secured party was entitled to the doUar value of 
the collateral over and above the senior's secured debt. 
134. In Louis Zahn Drug Co. v. Bank of Oak Brook Terrace, 95 Ill. App. 3d 
435, 420 N.E.2d 276 (1981), the court distinguished between the written notice re-
quirement of U.C.C. § 9-504(3) and the knowledge but no writing requirement of 
U.C.C. § 9-507(1): "[A]ny person whose security interest has been made known to the 
HeinOnline -- 28 Wayne L. Rev. 679 1981-1982
1982] COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 679 
VI. ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS 
In an opinionlas obviously distressing to institutions handling de-
mand instruments, the attorney general held that a bank or other 
lending institution may not charge a customer a fee on a stop payment 
order. las The opinion is based upon the language of the statutory pro-
vision creating the right to stop paymentla7 and the official Code com-
ment to the section which provides: 
The position taken by this section is that stopping payment 
is a service which depositors expect and are entitled to receive 
from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience, and 
expense. The inevitable occasional losses through failure to 
stop payment should be borne by the banks as a cost of the 
business of banking. las 
The attorney general opines that the practice of conditioning the 
exercise of the right to stop payment upon a fee is an attempt to 
reallocate the bank's risk and is impermissible under the Code provi-
sions. The opinion ignores, however, the fact that the bank's expenses 
in acting upon stop payment orders will be reallocated elsewhere as 
general costs of the banking business and ultimately spread among all 
customers, not just those who elect to stop payment. 
In another opinion,la9 the attorney general determined that the 
secured pany prior to the disposition of the collateral may recover for losses caused by 
a failure to comply with the Act." Id. at 441,420 N.E.2d at 280. In Louis Zahn, the 
senior creditor had not received written notice but did have knowledge of the junior 
creditor's interest because junior had contacted senior and attempted to negotiate a 
settlement of the senior's lien. The Illinois coun held that the failure of a junior 
secured pany to give written notice of a claim of interest in collateral does not 
foreclose him from contesting the commercial reasonableness of the sale and seeking 
damages if proven. Section 9-507(1) merely requires that the junior's interest has been 
made known to the senior; it does not require written notification as does section 
9-504(3). 
135. Although an opinion of the attorney general is not a binding interpretation 
of law which courts must follow, it does command the allegiance of state agencies. 
Detroit Edison Co. v. Depanment of Revenue, 320 Mich. 506, 31 N.W.2d 809 (1948). 
136. Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 5867 (Apr. 13, 1981). 
137. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.4403(1) (1967) provides: 
A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable 
for his account but the order must be received at such time and in such man-
ner as to afford the bank a reasonable opponunity to act on it prior to any 
action by the bank with respect to the item described in section 4303. 
138. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.4403, Comment 2 (1967), quoted t"n Mich. 
Att'y Gen. Op. No. 5867 at 2 (Apr. 13, 1981). 
139. Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 5722 (June 18, 1980). 
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Credit Insurance Act140 does not prohibit insurance on "open-ended" 
or "line of credit" loans so long as: the insurance which is written runs 
co-extensively with the duration of the loan and the amount payable 
by the insurer is limited to an amount not in excess of the original in-
debtedness. Supplementary insurance coverage for additional in-
debtedness would require both a refinancing or renewal of the original 
indebtedness and the issuance of a new policy or certificate of in-
surance. 
140. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 550.601-.624 (1967). 
